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Discusses a report by Hann and Williams from Coventry Polytechnic Department of Industrial Design. The aim of the report was to assess the problems facing a male‐oriented course, when attempting to attract female applicants. The research took the form of two questionnaires – one questioned girls in schools, the other questioned women who had studied or who were currently studying industrial design, and showed that many factors contribute to the non‐participation of women in industrial design, specifically automotive design. Perceptions of course titles were an important factor. The research concluded that women express little interest in car design, preferring to design domestic consumer products. However, women expressed interest in the management of design projects. Concludes that there is an important role for women in transport design.

Quebec was the first Canadian jurisdiction to legislate on pay equality. It did so through the adoption of the Charter of Rights and Freedom, in 1976, a passive legislation since it is based on complaints. It seems to be a matter of time before the Quebec Government passes a pro‐active legislation on pay equity and, in doing so, it will likely draw its inspiration from the Pay Equity Act (PEA) passed by the Ontario Government in 1987. One of PEAs important features is the emphasis on institutional structures and practices in determining the appropriate unit for the purpose of achieving pay equity. In practice, such units will often match up with the usual job families (e.g. clerical or office vs production jobs). However, the historical development of jobs families is intertwined with the evolution of occupational segregation between men and women in the labour markets.

The rule change for segment reporting in 1998 has arguably made segment reporting more relevant through the adoption of the management approach. Meanwhile, the management approach has resulted in a decrease in the comparability of segment income. We introduce firmspecific measures of changes in relevance and comparability due to the rule change. Our treatment firms experienced an increase in the relevance of segment reporting but a large decrease in the comparability of segment income; our benchmark firms barely experienced any changes in relevance and comparability. We examine earnings forecasts before vs. after the rule change issued by financial analysts—a major user group of segment reporting. Relative to benchmark firms, treatment firms’ analyst forecast error reductions around the segment disclosure event are not significantly different after the rule change than before the rule change, but treatment firms’ forecast dispersion reductions around the segment disclosure event are significantly larger after the rule change than before the rule change. These results suggest that despite the decrease in comparability, the new segment reporting rule has increased the decision usefulness of segment information by decreasing disagreement among analysts.

The accounting literature has traditionally focused on firm-level studies to examine the capital market implications of earnings and other accounting variables. We first develop the arguments for studying capital market implications at the aggregate level as well. A central issue is that diversification makes equity investors at least partially and potentially almost completely immune to several firm-level properties of earnings by holding diversified portfolios. Diversification is particularly important when assessing the welfare consequences of random errors in accounting measurement (imperfect accruals) and, to the extent it is independent across firms, of deliberate manipulation (earnings management). Consequently, some firm-level metrics of association, timeliness, value relevance, conservatism and other earnings properties do not map easily into investor welfare. Similarly, earnings-related risk manifests itself to equity investors largely through systematic earnings risk (covariation with aggregate earnings and/or other macroeconomic indicators). We conclude that the design and evaluation of financial reporting must adopt at least in part an aggregate perspective. We then summarize the literature in accounting, economics and finance on aggregate earnings and stock prices. Our review highlights the importance of studying earnings at the aggregate level.

Prior studies find that US firms with managerial incentives may manipulate the earnings gap to obscure higher performing segments to competitors or to hide underperforming segments from external monitors. The purpose of this study is to complement extant research by examining the association between managerial incentives and segment earnings reporting of cross-listed firms in the USA and the impact of country-level characteristics on this association.

The dependent variable is the earnings gap between firm-level earnings and sum of segment-level earnings. Managerial incentives are proxied by proprietary cost and agency cost. Proprietary cost is measured by the Herfindahl index. Agency cost is measured by inefficient resource transfer activities across segments. Foreign firms in this study are companies listed on major US Stock Exchanges with headquarters outside the USA. Comparable US firms are selected using the Propensity Score Matching procedure as a control group.

The authors find that 1) proprietary cost motive is not the determinant of earnings gap reporting for cross-listed firms; 2) cross-listed firms motivated by agency costs are more likely to manipulate segment earnings reporting than US firms; and 3) among cross-listed firms motivated by agency costs, firms in weak rule of law countries demonstrate more manipulation in segment earnings than firms in strong rule of law countries.

Extant research with regard to segment reporting exclusively focuses on US firms, and little is known about the practice of segment reporting by cross-listed firms originating from different legal regimes. This study fills the gap in the literature by comparing cross-listed firms to US firms in the reporting of segment earnings. The results of this study have implications for regulators and investors who are interested in evaluating the extent of cross-listed firms’ financial reporting quality.

March 13, 1972 Master and Servant — Redundancy — Dismissal — Offer by employer of unskilled work — Offer refused by employee — Written notice by employee — Whether implied term employee bound to do unskilled work — Whether dismissal by employer or termination of contract by employee — Redundancy Payments Act, 1965 (c.62), s. 3(1).

Describes a number of experiments with electronic document delivery, and the copyright problems that are affecting its use. Considers the inadequacies of interlending for the user, the interlending in Eastern Europe and Australia. Outlines the impact of CD‐ROM on document supply and suggests that interlending can be a social, cultural and economic measure.

The aim of this article is to develop an understanding of marketing and customer relationships in software SMEs (small to medium‐sized enterprises) using a mixed methods approach.

The methodology combined qualitative research methods along with quantitative adaptive conjoint analysis (ACA). A software SME was investigated as a case study during the first stage of the investigation. In order to ascertain detailed customer perceptions and expectations of their software supplier, 16 semi‐structured interviews were conducted with the software SME's customers. The interviews subsequently informed the ACA, which was chosen as an analytical tool to establish quantitative hierarchy of relevant attributes identified at the qualitative stage of the study.

Marketing in software SMEs is dependant on effective relationships between the firm and its customers and these relationships should be based on providing a quality software solution, understanding the customer requirement and professionalism. Other marketing tactics that are used to improve customer perceived credibility include forming alliances and partnerships within the technology sector.

Software SMEs should proactively develop relationships with prospective as well as current customers and strive for a balance between customer orientation and innovation by involving the customer throughout the development of the software solution. The study's pragmatic approach has provided applicable results due to insight into a management case complemented with industry expectation of software product and service delivery.

This combination of methods has made it possible to explore marketing and customer relationships in the software industry from multiple viewpoints. Therefore, the findings contribute to the limited literature of marketing in software SMEs and customers' decision‐making processes when purchasing software.

This paper aims to examine whether external monitors (auditors and analysts) constrain earnings strings, an indicator of earnings management, and whether this monitoring is more effective after the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), given the emphasis of SOX on improving auditing, financial reporting and the information environment.

Agency theory establishes the premise between external monitoring and earnings strings. Auditor tenure and number of analysts following provide measures for external monitoring quality. Using prior research, empirical models explaining the presence of an earnings strings and earnings strings trend are developed to test the hypotheses.

Pre-SOX, extreme auditor tenure, indicating lower quality external monitoring, is associated with greater earnings strings trend, and analyst coverage is associated with increased likelihood of earnings strings and greater earnings strings trend consistent with analyst pressure on management. More effective auditor and analyst monitoring occurs post-SOX in terms of reduced likelihood of earnings strings and earnings strings trend.

The authors provide evidence on how elements of external monitoring are associated with increased earnings strings pre-SOX. Further, they contribute to the debate on the impact of SOX on external firm monitoring and the overall financial information environment. By focusing on earnings strings, the outcome of earnings management, the authors provide a unique understanding of external monitoring that also provides insight on the overvaluation of equity and ultimate destruction of firm value. The evidence demonstrates how regulation has contributed to an improved financial reporting environment and external monitoring.